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Abstract; The management of Lake Victoria is a high priority to the riparian countries that benefit directly from its
resources. Management regulations have been formulated and implemented with the aim of maintaining the lake's
ecological quality as well as sustaining fisheries exploitation for economic gain. Results indicate, however, that the
regulations have not been successful in maintaining the state of the lake's ecosystem nor the fisheries. There has been a
continuing decline in fish catches as well as declining biodiversity. Currently, the riparian countTies are considering the
introduction of a co-management regime as an alternative managerial strategy to address the lake's problems. In this
paper it is argued that the failure of the former management regulations was because ownership of the lake was not
clearly defined. It is further argued that even if co-management were to be successfully instituted, it will yield very
minimal results if the problem of ownership is not properly addressed. This paper explores the ownership status of the
lake based on data collected in Tanzania, and examines the relationship between, and significance of, ownership and
co-management. The research makes recommendations for how these concepts can contribute to an integrated
management of the lake.
Introduction
The fisheries of Lake Victoria are as timeless and important as the lake itself. The riparian communities
have always depended on this fishery 'for their subsistence activities, employment and generation of food
for consumption. The lake, therefore, has been part and parcel of the lives of the riparian communities for
millennia. This traditional guardianship of the lake's resources ended in 1947 with creation of the Lake
Victoria Fisheries Service, a central authority established to manage the lake and its resources on behalf of
the riparian states. This responsibility was later taken over by the national fisheries departments (Witte and
van Densen, 1995), and the strategy adopted by these departments was a top-down management regime in
which the Fisheries Departments single handedly implemented national fisheries policy. In 1972, however,
the Tanzanian state decided that this system was increasingly Linable to cope with local level problems, and
power was divested 'from the centre to District Fisheries Officers who were answerable to their District
Development Committees. In Tanzania, Districts are grouped together to form regions, of which three
border Lake Victoria. Each region has its own Regional Fisheries Officer (RFO) who is answerable to the
Director for Fisheries in Dar es Salaam. In this way, horizontal linkages were created within the Tanzanian
fisheries management hierarchy.
The above strategy did not, however, relocate power to local people but only enabled decisions to be made
at much lower (district) levels than previously. In 1997, a further articulation o'f this strategy occurred with
the creation on Beach Management Units (BMIJs)2. In part, this latter strategy has occurred because of the
government's recognition that there are a number of positive benefits associated with community
participation in fisheries management. These perceived benefits include recognition of the vital role that the
private sector, the community, non-governmental organisations and other non-state actors play in the
development, management and sustainable utilisation of the fisheries resource base. Implicitly, the state has
also recognised that top-down management regimes are problematic, and hope that the desire to promote the
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sustainable utilisation of the fisheries resources base for present and future generations may in some
measure be met by including fishing communities in the management of the resource. Before mid 1980s
catches were steadily, but gently, increasing In 1986, the Nile perch boom started, which led to a very
rapid increase in catches from some 100,000 tonnes in 1985 to over 250,000 tonnes. Since 1994, however,
catches have started to decline.
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Figure 1: Lake Victoria (Tanzania) landings from 1969 to 1995
(Sources: Greboval and Fryd, 1994; Unpublished Department of Fisheries figures).
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In Tanzania, participatory management has promised to improve the legitimacy of regulations (Hoza and
Mahatane, 1998; Jetitoft, 1989), and has reoriented the thinking of fisheries managers towards the incluon
of fishing communities in the fisheries management hierarchy. This desire has given birth to over DO0
BMUs formed along the entire Tanzanian coastline. In most cases, the creation of each BMU followed a
one-day consultative meeting at each beach between the Fisheries Division and the local communities.
The BMUs are, however, an extension of the Fisheries Division and are not a community management
regime. They have been formed without community consent nor opinion, but on government instructions.
This view that the BMUs have been imposed upon fishing communities from without is one held by fishing
communities, particularly members of the BMUs themselves (cf. SEDAWOG, 2000a). Thus, while
horizontal changes occurred to the overall structure of the Fisheries Department occurred
(intragovernmentally) in 1972, the formation of BIVIUs served to extend the vertical hierarchy of the
Fisheries Department to the lake shore. The regulations the BMUs are expected to implement and enforce,
indeed, are state regulations.
The introduction of these BMUs is expected to reverse recent catch declines (see Fig. 1). This paper argues
that the decline in catches has been due to the open access status of the lake. Individual fishermen have no
rights to exclude others from fishing, and this breeds the idea amongst fishermen that leaving fish to breed
and grow, simply leaves these fish for other fishermen to take. The result is, therefore, a 'race-to-fish'
subsequently a decline in catches. So long as the lake is open to all, any management regime will not yield
desired managerial goals of sustainable fisheries. The open access nature of fisheries is a fundamental cause
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of poor economic performance and biological overexploitation. Co-management, on the other hand, only
allows local communities to participate in the management process but not to own the resources of the lake.
It does not address the open access state of the lake. This paper proposes that local corn irwiities shouli be
allowed to own the lake. This will generate user values as well as user rights, which will l:d to sustiable
fishery. Towards the end of the papel, a few examples are given of how ownership
produced sustainable fisheries elsewhere in the world.
The tragedy of the commons
Hardin's (1968) theory of the 'Tragedy of the Commons' clearly illustrates the concept of ownership.
Hardin develops his theory around a metaphorical pastureland open to all. The fact that the pastureland is
open has attracted much comment on Hardin's work because he implies that 'open access' is synonymous
with common property. Irrespective of where Hardin places his emphasis, this does not detract from the
problem of the resource's ownership status. In many cases, common property has user rights for specified
groups associated with it, but such groups have no legal rights to possessing the resource.
The Hardin example based on pastureland may be equated with access rights to Lake Victoria's fisheries,
which have a finite fishing capacity. The implication is that if there are more fishermen than the lake can
handle, each fisherman will catch less and the lake's productivity will decrease. Hardin was particularly
interested in the economic decision-making process of a rational herdsman who is interested in maximizing
his benefits. He argues that, as a rational being, each herdsman will seek to maximise his gain, more or less
continuously asking himself what the utility of adding one more animal to his herd will be. I-Jardin be]ieved
that a rational herdsman would always keep on adding animals to his herd.
In the fisheries of Lake Victoria, the rational fisherman will maximise his catch by devising ways and
means of increasing the catch, which may imply using illegal gear, and/or increasing his fleet capacity.
Drawing on Hardin's argument, since a fisherman receives all the benefits from any catch increase, the
benefit of increasing his catch (by adding more boats and or using illegal gear) can be said to be -Fl, which
is a function of the costs created by additional catch. Since the costs of over-fishing are shared by all
fishermen, the negative utility for any individual fisherman is only a fraction ofi (Harchin, 1968: 1244),
which is subtracted from his positive benefit s. Hardin then concludes that the end result is the collapse of
the resource and the 'tragedy of the commons'.
In this theory the underlying issue is that the resource (lake) is 'open to all'. This condition implies that
nobody owns it and nobody can be held responsible if ìt is degraded, destroyed or misused. Everybody,
however, potentially enjoys the benefits of it when it is productive. Steins (1999) defines 'open access' as a
state in which the common-pool resource has no use rights attached to a specific group, resulting in a
general 'free for all'.
Ownership
'Ownership' is the possession, or holding, of a resource with the associated full rights to use. Ownership is
a critical factor in management since it determines the linkage between responsibility and authority over the
resource, and also determines incentive structures for sustainable use. Barrow and Murphree (1998: 3)
emphasise this by stating that, "[ut is important to create an appropriate, functional framework for
community conservation, one primarily based on ownership".
Ownership of a resource basically implies possession and use rights. A right is a claim to a benefit stream
that is consciously protected, in most cases, by the state. Rights define the uses that are legitimately viewed
as exclusive and the penalties for violating those rights. Rights are exercised following a clearly defined set
of rules. For example, a right provides the authority for a fisher to operate in a specific fishing ground.
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How the fisher exercises that right through fishing activity is specified by rules which may dictate the type
of fishing gear used or the time of year when the fishing gear an be used (Pomeroy and Harkes, 1999).
Schlager and Ostrom (1993) distinguish between different types of rights:
access rights: the rights to enter a physical property e.g. participate in the fishery.
Withdrawal rights: the right to obtain the products of a resource e.g. fish catches.
Management rights: the right to devise operational-level rights of withdrawal. This is where co-
management falls.
Exclusion rights: the right to devise operational-level rights of access.
Transfer rights: the right to sell or lease all or part of the above collective-choice rights.
When possession and use rights are exercised together, sustainable management is likely to be successful.
But when use rights are exercised without possession, the result may or may not be sustainable. For Lake
Victoria it has been unsustainable. Why should this happen?
When there are use rights in Common Property (or Pool) Resources (CPRs), then users will be always be
affected by the following 'externalities' (Ostrom, 1995):
subtractability: whatever fish is caught by one fisherman will not be available for other fishermen to
catch from the lake. This means that fishers will want to catch as much fish as possible regarler. of
what this means in the long term. In Lake Victoria this problem is compounded by the problem That
access rights are not defined in ternis of who can fish, but in terms of what gear is permitted. Nor do
there exist limitations on how much fishermen are allowed to catch (quotas).
Excludability: because fishermen cannot exclude others from the fishery, as many fishermen as
possible will join the fishery. This will lead to overexploitation, degradation and the eventual ruin of
the resource. This is attributed to user incentives to maximise their own utility (Steins, 1999), and is
one of the major causes of degradation of Lake Victoria.
Possession has the tendency to create a feeling of use value. This will lead to the responsible use of a
resource or an item. In economics, the responsible use of a resource is equivalent to efficiency. As Swanson
and Göschl, (1999) argue, ownership (property rights) lias implications for efficiency because property
rights are, iii themselves, an incentive for the responsible use of resources. From Swanson and Göschis'
(1999) perspective, because ownership implies that the costs of maintaining a resource fall upon its owner,
it follows that owners will seek to utilise their resources responsibly. In order to achieve the sustainable
exploitation of a CPR, therefore, ownership (possession and use rights) must be guaranteed. How does this
argument relate to co-management?
Co-management lias been defined as a partnership arrangement in which government, a community of local
resource users (fishers), external agents (non-governmental organisations, academic and research
institutions), and other fisheries and coastal resource stakeholders (boat owners, fish traders, money
lenders, tourism establishments etc.) share the responsibility and authority for decision-making over the
management of a fishery. The partners develop an agreement that specifies their roles, responsibilities, and
rights in management (Poniei'oy and Harkes, 1999).
By calling for partners to develop an agreement that specifies their roles, responsibilities and rights in
management, co-management lias ownership implications which it confines to managerial roles and not to
the resource base itself. It covers various partnership arrangements, degrees of power sharing, and the
integration of local (informal, traditional, customary) and central ised government management systems. Co-
management involves various degrees of delegation of managerial responsibility and authority between the
local-level (resource users, stakeholders and community) and the state level (national, provincial, municipal
and village government).
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It seeks equity in fisheries management and strives for more active fisher participation in the planning aiid
implementation of fisheries management. Its major theme is that self-involveiríent in the management of the
resource will lead to a stronger commitment to comply with management strategies and sustainable resource
use (Pomeroy and Harkes, 1999). By delegating the ownership of the management process to local
communities, co-management is a first step towards property ownership.
Co-management in its entirety places the resource users as external to the resource. They only exercise
management rights, which may have to do more with their skills. This is not, however, sufficient if a
sustained fishery is sought. This is because co-management, just like any management system, may drive
the manager to strive for (personal) benefits. This may be compounded if the marginal costs incurred for
any adverse decisions made are perceived as lower than the marginal benefits to be obtained. This ensures
that the positive benefits of co-management may not be felt in the immediate future, and the nmagival
benefits initially gained from co-management's implementation may ultimately decline. Because the co-
manager remains external to the resource itself, and does not own it, s/he may eventually become excluded
from the management system, and the sustainable management of the fishery cannot be considered to have
been achieved. If, however, the co-manager is the principle user of the resource, and has no other major
alternative source of livelihood, the situation becomes considerably more complex, and it is for this reason
that it is argued here that there is need to move ahead from co-management to full property ownership.
Efforts being made to co-manage Lake Victoria have already been initiated through an approach that raises
a lot of questions. This approach places the community external to the lake, and it uses the community to
enforce government regulations which have been made with no input from communities. The argument here
is that any management approach that relegates the community to a position external to the lake, does not
address possession and use-rights jointly, and will not a achieve sustainable fishery. This is because such a
regime will not recognise lake users as the best custodians of the lake. When the community views itself as
external to the lake, any sense of responsibility will not be developed. For the sustainable fisheries of Lake
Victoria, there has to be a sense of responsibility generated from a transfer of ownership or proprietorship
from the state to the community and the resource-user level (Barrow and Murphree, 1998).
Moreover, these co-managerial approaches have not taken into account survey findings, which examined
the suitability of Lake Victoria for co-management, and which found that the criteria proposed by Ostrorn
(1990) and Pinkerton (1989) for the successful implementation community involvement in management
were met on several counts along the shore of the Trnzanian section of Lake Victoria (SEDA WOG, 2000b).
In addition, the survey identified a series of major the major problems, which can be used to define the
basis on which the collective action of fisher folk can be established for the creation of a solid co-
management regime. The three major problems identified in Tanzania were: use of illegal fishing
techniques, gear theft, and lack of regulation (SEDAWOG, 2000b).
The ownership status of Lake Victoria
The complexities associated with managing Lake Victoria are directly related to its status as a common-
property resource. One may consider the lake zone as having no clearly defined boundaries. At best it can
be described as a band of land and water on either side of the shoreline, which is defined in different ways
in different localities and national contexts according to physical, biological and cultural criteria (Steins,
1999).
Perceptions of the lake present a frustrating atmosphere for the development and implementation of
management strategies. It is perceived as a 'free for all resource'. 43% of Tanzanian fishermen surveyed by
SEDA WOG (2000b) believed that nobody or everybody owned the lake. From the survey, however, it could
also be deduced that local fishermen perceived government ownership as synonymous with open access.
Moreover, the fishermen believed that they could fish from anywhere in the lake, and believed that
everybody should be allowed to fish and that nobody should be prevented from fishing (SEDAWOG,
2000b).
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On the other hand, the government perceives the lake as a revenue-generating resource. The Local District
Councils in Tanzania generate income from licenses charged to fishermen and fishing boats. Thus the more
fishermen and boats which can be registered, the more income will be generated. Anybody with the
recommended equipment is not refused entry into the fishery.
The open access state of the lake is one of the reasons why local fishermen perceive an increase in the
number of fishermen and boats in 1999 compared to 1994. In fact over 80% of the fishermen interviewed
agreed that there had been an increase in the number of fishermen and boats (SEDAWOG, 2000b).
Disobedience of regulations is yet another response of fishermen to open access conditions, and 54% of
fishermen interviewed for the SEDAWOG (2000b) study said that they saw more fishermen using illegal
fishing techniques in 1999 than they did in 1994.
Some cases where ownership of resource has led to better-managed common-pool resources
Tagba Lagoon (Ivory Coast) (1-Ividing and Jul-Larsen, 1995): the ownership regime here is based on
territorial user rights. These are clearly defined and allocated according to family groups. This lagoon
is divided into three family tenitories, and the families manage their territories on the basis of three
different principles: control over access by foreigners through establishment of quotas and fees; the
limitation of fishing efforts through regulating seine setting and through the prohibition of fishing on
certain days and in certain areas; and organising collective production and marketing types, which
effectively control the effort of participants. It is reported that while this tenure system has created a
range of conflicts, it has prevented the exhaustion of the resource and the impoverishment of the
villagers.
Lake Chiuta Malawi ÇNormann et al, 1998): the management of the fishery of this lake had initially
been under customary tenure. The fishery was managed and regulations enforced by the Chief d
fishers' committees. Their roles were to limit entry and to monitor the stocks of the lake. The result
of this management system led to increase in catches and the maintenance of stocks.
Zeeland province, Eastern Sheldt, the Netherlands (I-Iaandrickman, 2000; Ginkel, 1989). In this area,
there is a multi-species fishery. One of the species is the mussel, which is farmed off the coast of the
Sheldt. The cultivation takes place on designated plots, which are owned by the government but
leased for about ten years to companies and farmers. Each plot is clearly demarcated with floating
logs. Thus each farmer or company manages its own fishing ground. The result of this has been an
increasing stock.
Viti Levu, Fiji Islands (South Pacific) (Jennings and Polunin, 1996; Cooke et al. 1996). On this
island there is a well-established system of traditional rights to fishing grounds known as 'qoliqoli',
officially known as Customary Fishing Rights Areas (CFRA), which are owned by local community
members. These people manage their own fishing areas through committees. Management issues
differ from one place to another but basically focus on access restrictions, closed seasons in certain
areas in order to alleviate bait-fishing pressure, protect corals, protect the fragile vegetation of the
small island, and stop uncontrolled béche-de-mere fishing, amongst others.
There are two themes that are common to the above case studies: firstly, there is some form of ownersHip
system in which resource users have rights to identified areas of fishing ground. These rights appear as
territorial user rights in fisheries (TURFs), customary tenure designated plots and customary fishing rights
areas. The second is the beneficial effect of these strategies on marine stocks and the economic
performance of exploiters. In all these case studies, community ownership of these common-pool resources
have led to either increases in stock, better incomes for the communities and/or a high management index.
Lake Victoria will not be an exception to the above studies if some form of ownership can be introduced.
The lake is surrounded by local communities who are organised in form of villages recognised by the
riparian governments.
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Each village has some form of leadership which can tackle most village problems, such as conflicts,
security and administration. Just as in Viti Lev u and Lake Chuta, these villages can be vested with povvcrs
to control access to the lake and exclude othes from fishing. By patrolling their beaches, these villages
can implement this management strategy. Furthermore, these villages can also participate in monitoring
fish stocks through taking daily catch data. As already discussed above, what would be fundamental to the
success of such a strategy would be to introduce ownership (not only use-rights, but also possession rights)
of the lake by the local communities. The formation of co-management units, which has already
commenced in Tanzania, is a strategy which attempts to ensure that local fishermen own the management
process. This nascent management system can be built upon to allow communities to own the lake. What is
required is to reorganise these Beach Management Units (BMUs) so that they may have local support and
backing.
Conclusion
In order to sustainably manage Lake Victoria, its ownership status has to be addressed. There is a tendency
witìin the Tanzanian fisheries management community of wanting to involve local communities within a
top-down framework, in which the government imposes Beach Management Units upon fishing
communities. In essence, this only serves to increase the degree of vertical integration inherent within the
management hierarchy, and does not create any horizontal linkages. Managing the lake requires real
partnership alliances, principally between the govemment and the communities. Moreover, communities
should play a pivotal role in this partnership. In order to achieve this, the management system adopted
should not be simplified to the mere provision of benefits, but has to relate to wider issues of land use and
tenure together with local and national economic needs and aspirations.
Recommendations
The government is principally the owner of all natural resources. Local communities do not,
however, perceive themselves as part of their government but as its subjects. This perception needs
to be changed.
Ownership transfer: the Fisheries Division should t1nsfer ownership of the lake from itself to the
local fishing communities. These communities should be allocated territories from which they can
fish.
(e) A law should be enacted to create ensure that only those fishermen who ae members of fishermen's
organisations can fish. This will facilitate the transfer of ownership to fishing communities, as well as
control entry to the lake.
Fishermen should be given exclusive rights to the lake. These should pertain not only to rights of
withdrawal, but also to exclusion rights and transfer rights.
Co-management efforts already in placQ should be reviewed based on new facts emerging from
various field studies.
fl4
References
Barrow E and M. Murphee, 1998. Community conservation in Africa: principles and comparative practice.
Working paper number 8, Institute for Development and Policy Management, University of
Manchester.
Cooke, A, J., N.y.C. Polunin, and K. Moce. 1996. comparative assessment ofstakeholdermanagement in
tra ditional Fijian fishing-grounds. FAO BP3 971 Antananarivo, Madagascar.
Ginkel R V. 1989. The musse! men of Yerseke: an ethno-historical perspective. In Durand, J. R., Lemoalle,
J. and Weber, J. (Eds). OSTR 0M-1ER EMER syposium sur la recherche face a lapech artisanale.
Montpellier, France, 3-7 July, 1989. Paris, OSTROM: 491-499.
Greboval, D. and D. Fryd. 1993. Inland fisheries of Eastern/Central/Southern Africa: basic fisheries
statistics. FAO/UNDP (Bujumbura), June 1993, Ref.: RAF/871099-TD/52/93 (En.), Food and
Agricultural Organisation, Rome.
Jennings S and N. V. C. Polunin 1996 Fishing strategies, fishery development and socio-economics in
traditionally managed Fijian fishing grounds. Fisheries Management and Ecology 3 (1999): 335-
347.
Jentoft, S. 1989. Fisheries co-management: delegating government responsibilities to fishermen's
organisations. Marine Policy 13 (2): 137-154.
Haandrickman., V. 2000. Eastern Sheldt. Lecture Notes for International Course on Alternative approaches
to fisheries Management: the relevance of co-management, Jan 16g' to March 11 2000. International
AgriculturaJ Centre, Wageningen, The Netherlands.
Hardin, G. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162: 1243-1248.
Hviding, E. and E. Jul-Larsen. 1995 Community-based resource management in tropical fisheries.
Windhoek, 1995. Windhoek, University of Namibia.
Onyango, P. 0. 2000. Study on Community involvement in fisheries from production to
marketing. Proposal. LVEMP study objective
Ostrom, E. 1995. Constituting social capital and collective action. In R. O. Keohane and E. Ostrom, E.
(Ed s.) Local commons and global interdependence: heterogeneity and cooperation in two domains. Sage
Publications, London: 125-160.
Normann, A. K., J. R. Nielsen and S. Sverdrup-Jensen. (Eds.) 1998. Fisheries Co-management in Africa.
Proceedings from a regional workshop on fisheries co-management research 18-20 March 1997
Boadzulu Lakeshore Resort, Mangochi Malawi. Fisheries Co-management Research Project Research
RertNo. 12 ICLARM and IFM
Pomeroy, R., and I. Harkes. 1999. Lecture Notes for the International Course on Alternative approaches io
fisheries Management: the relevance of co-management. January 16Eh to March 11th 2000.
International Agricultural Centre, Wageningen, The Netherlands.
115
Schlager, E. and E. Ostrom. 1993. Property rights regimes and coastal fisheries: an empirical analysis. In T.
L. Anderson and R.T Simmons (Eds). The political economy of customs and culture. informal
solutions to the commons problem. Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Lanhain, Maryland: 13-41.
SEDA WOG, 2000A. Results of the co-management survey. In Geheb, K. and Crean, K. (Eds.) The Co-
management Survey: Co-managerial perspectives for Lake Victoria's fisheries. L VFRP Technical
Doume-it 11. Jinja, Socio-economic Data Working Group of the Lake Victoria Fisheries Research
Project: 13-26.
SEDA WOG 2000b. ReporL of the PRA carried out at Ihale Beach, Tanzania, April 11-14, 2000. In GEHEB, K.
(Ed.) The Co-marngement Survey: PRA reports from four beaches on Lake Victoria. L VFRP
Technical Document No. 9. LVFRP/TECH/00/09. The Socio-economic Data Working Group of the
Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project, Jinja.: 5-36.
Steins, N. A. 1999. All hands on deck: an intera cti ve perspecti ve on complex common-pool resource
management based on case studies in the coastal waters of the Isle of Wiht (UK.), Gonnenuara
(Ireland) and the Dutch Wadden Sea. Ponsen & Looijen BV, Wageningen.
Swanson, T. and T. Göschl. 1999. Property rights issues involving plant genetic resources: implications of
ownership for economic efficiency. Ecological Econ omics 32 (1999): 76-92.
United Republic of Tanzania, 1997. National Fisheries Policy and Strategy Statement. Government Printers
Dar-es-salaam.
Van Ginkel, R. 1989. The Musselmen of Yerseke: an ethno-historical perspective. Contributions49l-499.
Witte, F. and W. L. T. van Densen (Eds.). 1995. Fish stocks and fisheries ofLake Victoria: a handbook for field
observations. Samara Publishing, Cardigen, Dyfed, Great Britain.
116
